Trusting the Tax Office: Does Putnam's thesis relate to tax? by Job, Jenny et al.
 Trusting the Tax Office:
Does Putnam’s thesis
relate to tax?
Jenny Job and Monika Reinhart
WORKING PAPER NO 53 • FEBRUARY 2004
  
 
 
 
TRUSTING THE TAX OFFICE:  
DOES PUTNAM’S THESIS  
RELATE TO TAX? 
 
Jenny Job and Monika Reinhart 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Tax System Integrity 
Research School of Social Sciences 
Australian National University 
Canberra, ACT, 0200 
 
ISBN 0 642 76849 8. 
ISSN 1444-8211 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER No 53 
February 2004 
 ii
Centre for Tax System Integrity, Research School of Social Sciences, 
Australian National University 2004 
 
Commonwealth of Australia 2004 
 
 
 
National Library of Australia 
Cataloguing-in-Publication data: 
 
 
Job, Jenny. 
Trusting the Tax Office: Does Putnam's thesis relate to tax? 
  
  
Bibliography. 
ISBN 0 642 76849 8. 
  
1. Australian Taxation Office - Public opinion. 2. Social 
capital (Sociology) - Australia. 3. Trust - Australia.  
4. Taxation - Australia - Public opinion. 5. Public opinion - 
Australia. I. Reinhart, Monika. II. Centre for Tax 
System Integrity. III. Title. (Series: Working paper 
(Centre for Tax System Integrity); no. 53). 
  
  
336.200994 
 
 
 
If you would like to make any comments on this working paper please contact the author 
directly within 90 days of publication. 
 
 
 
Disclaimer 
 
This article has been written as part of a series of publications issued from the Centre for 
Tax System Integrity. The views contained in this article are representative of the author 
only. The publishing of this article does not constitute an endorsement of or any other 
expression of opinion by the Australian National University or the Commissioner of 
Taxation of the author's opinion. The Australian National University and the 
Commissioner of Taxation do not accept any loss, damage or injury howsoever arising that 
may result from this article. This article does not constitute a public or private ruling within 
the meaning of the Taxation Administration Act 1953, nor is it an advance opinion of the 
Commissioner of Taxation. 
 iii
THE CENTRE FOR TAX SYSTEM INTEGRITY 
WORKING PAPERS 
 
 
The Centre for Tax System Integrity (CTSI) is a specialised research unit set up as a 
partnership between the Australian National University (ANU) and the Australian Taxation 
Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
contestation occur within the tax system.  
 
This series of working papers is designed to bring the research of the Centre for Tax System 
Integrity to as wide an audience as possible and to promote discussion among researchers, 
academics and practitioners both nationally and internationally on taxation compliance. 
 
The working papers are selected with three criteria in mind: (1) to share knowledge, 
experience and preliminary findings from research projects; (2) to provide an outlet for 
policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
papers destined for publication in academic journals, edited collections, or research 
monographs. 
 
 
 iv
Acknowledgments 
 
Our thanks to Valerie Braithwaite, Andrew Stout and Greg Rawlings for their comments 
on drafts of this paper. Thanks also to Brian Harrold for assistance with the editing of this 
manuscript. We would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful 
comments and suggestions. 
 v
Abstract 
 
Data from the Community Participation and Citizenship Survey are used to explore the 
factors that influence people to place trust in strangers and impersonal others. We use 
Putnam’s social capital thesis to explore whether civic engagement and associational 
membership are major factors in the development of generalised or social trust, and 
whether this kind of trust is generalisable to trust in government institutions, specifically 
the Australian Taxation Office. There is partial support for Putnam’s thesis that civic 
engagement develops social trust. More important is affective trust which is developed in 
the family and through familiar others. We find that trust is generalisable, being extended 
to strangers and to the impersonal others in government institutions. It is trust that builds 
trust – and government institutions like the Tax Office begin their task with benefits 
accrued through generalised trust. 
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Introduction 
 
Complex societies require that we generalise trust to those who are not personally known 
to us in order to maintain social relations and to facilitate social action. While many 
bemoan loss of trust in institutions and government (Fattore, Turnbull & Wilson, 2003; 
Inglehart, 1997; Papadakis, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Wuthnow, 1998), some have marvelled at 
how many of us arrive at ‘a standing decision’ to give others who we do not know ‘the 
benefit of the doubt’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 136). This applies not only to other individuals - 
institutions attract similar good will. Even an institution like the Australian Taxation Office 
(Tax Office) enjoys community trust (Braithwaite & Reinhart, 2000). However, the factors 
which influence people to trust those they do not know, or know little of, including those in 
government institutions, remain open to debate. 
 
Putnam’s (1993) social capital thesis implies that generalised or social trust is developed 
through civic engagement and associational membership (Stolle, 2001), but does not 
distinguish different types of trust and whether they might be developed in different ways 
(Fattore et al., 2003). More recently, Putnam (2000, p. 137) has stated that trust in 
government and its institutions is different from social trust, leaving us to conclude that it 
is developed in a different way. However, if trust is relational and generalisable (V. 
Braithwaite, 1998; Braithwaite & Levi, 1998), there is no reason why social trust cannot be 
extended to the impersonal others in government institutions. 
 
This paper uses survey data to explore the development of generalised or social trust in the 
Australian context in unknown persons and entities – strangers or impersonal others, and 
government institutions as examples of abstract systems. We focus on Putnam’s social 
capital thesis to explore whether civic engagement and associational membership are major 
factors in the development of generalised or social trust, and whether this kind of trust 
spills over into trust in government institutions, specifically the Tax Office. We argue that 
                                                 
1 Centre for Tax System Integrity, Research School of Social Sciences and Regulatory Institutions Network, 
Australian National University. 
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the capacity to trust strangers, including those in government institutions, is initially 
developed in the family and generalised to strangers, including strangers in government 
institutions such as the Tax Office. Taxpayers have a relationship with the Tax Office 
(Braithwaite, 2003a) and trust is an important factor in building the relationship in such a 
way that citizens will cooperate and comply with the Tax Office (Braithwaite, 2003b). We 
extend trust, assume goodwill, and make ourselves vulnerable until we have reason not to 
trust. 
 
This paper is divided into three sections: a brief discussion of the literature, followed by 
the methods used for the empirical analyses, and a presentation of the findings. We find 
relevance in Putnam’s ideas but with qualifications: that generalised trust develops from 
trust in familiar others and, in small part, from volunteering and engaging with the media, 
and that generalised trust extends to the impersonal others in government institutions. 
 
A brief review of trust and social capital 
 
There is as much debate about the value of the social capital thesis as there is about 
whether trust applies only to individuals or can be extended more broadly to groups and 
society in general. Putnam gives recognition to both sociological and psychological 
perspectives of trust. ‘Trust itself is an emergent property of the social system, as much as 
a personal attribute. Individuals are able to be trusting (and not merely gullible) because of 
the social norms and networks within which their actions are embedded’ (Putnam, 1993, p. 
177). Trust is the bridge between the personal and the social. 
 
The reason for its importance is that trust is a vital ingredient not only in building the 
bridge to the broader community but because it facilitates social cooperation and helps to 
maintain social order, stability and solidarity (Misztal, 1996; Murphy, 2003; Offe, 1999; 
Putnam, 1993; Warren, 1999). ‘Social networks allow trust to become transitive and 
spread: I trust you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trusts you … Trust is an 
essential component of social capital … because … trust lubricates cooperation.’ (Putnam, 
1993, pp. 169-171). Putnam (1995, p. 67) defines social capital as ‘features of social 
organisation, such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
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cooperation for mutual benefit’. Trust appears to be the link between social networks and 
norms of reciprocity. In Putnam’s thesis, social capital is developed in the social networks 
and social ties that people have with those they know, but more useful are the ties that 
people have with those they do not know because they expand one’s horizons and form a 
‘bridge’ to the broader community.2 Putnam (1993) used social capital in his Italian study 
as a framework for examining institutional performance and determining the origins of 
good and effective government. He relates social trust to good government by explaining 
that if people trust that everyone else is honest and complying, they will comply too. 
 
Trust is not an easy concept to define, and this difficulty has increased more recently with 
growing specialisation in the range of conceptualisations of trust (Misztal, 2001; Seligman, 
1997). We make no attempt here to explore all the meanings of trust - our emphasis is on 
the relational aspect of trust. Many suggest that trust is based on knowledge of either an 
individual or a collective, and expectations of future behaviour drawing on past experience 
(Hardin, 1998; Offe, 1999). Hardin (1998) has emphasised the importance of knowledge 
for predicting the behaviour of actors, thereby providing a base for trusting some and not 
trusting others. Faith or belief in others goes beyond knowledge, however, and many 
regard this as the essence of trust (J. Braithwaite, 1998; Pettit, 1998). Recently, this idea 
has been expressed in terms of a willingness to make oneself vulnerable. It is ‘mutual 
confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit another’s vulnerability’ (Misztal, 
2001, p. 372). Warren (1999, p. 1) maintains that ‘trust involves a judgment, however 
implicit, to accept vulnerability to the potential ill will of others by granting them 
discretionary power over some good’. Under this conception of trust, there is an element of 
risk in trusting others and those with power may exploit that trust (J. Braithwaite, 1998; 
Brennan, 1998; Pettit, 1998). 
 
Trust is conceptualised here in this broader sense. For better or worse, we trust those of 
whom we have little personal knowledge, and we are participants in the game of 
generalised trust. Generalised trust is important because if we extend trust only to those 
personally well known, we limit our social circle, our level of cooperation and our ability 
                                                 
2 ‘Bonding’ social capital is exclusive, whereas ‘bridging’ social capital is ‘outward looking’, and helps in 
spreading information and generalised reciprocity (Putnam, 2000, p. 22). 
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to share with and help others. Engagement only with those we know well can cut us off 
from a wide range of potentially beneficial interactions, and limit what the individual and 
society can achieve, both socially and economically (Putnam, 1993; Uslaner, 2002). This is 
Putnam’s reason for advocating networks of civic engagement which work across the 
community rather than confining our trust to the tight-knit bonds between family. This 
paper tests the development of generalised trust using Putnam’s social capital thesis. 
 
Why social trust and trust in institutions should be separated 
 
The importance of family and intimate acquaintance for the development and maintenance 
of trust has had a long tradition in psychology (Delhey & Newton, 2002; Erikson, 1963; 
Misztal, 1996; Uslaner, 2002). 
 
Stack (1978) highlighted two paths to trusting, one largely based on subjective feelings 
(affection, respect, reverence), the other on evidence from our experiences of the world. 
Extending this line of thinking is Warren’s (1999, p. 330) distinction between trust with 
cognitive or affective origins. Affective trust develops in love, friendship and parent/child 
relationships and emphasises shared interests (Warren, 1999). Cognitive trust develops 
from ‘judgments about the circumstances surrounding a trust relation [and is] especially 
relevant to trust relations with institutions, strangers, business associates, and political 
representatives’ (Warren, 1999, pp. 330-331). This type of trust allows institutions like the 
Tax Office to be trusted because people make judgments based on the knowledge they gain 
through social networks, the rules of an institution, the legitimacy of rules, and shared 
knowledge of those in the institution and the community. Warren (1999, p. 338) maintains 
that the opportunity to monitor and to challenge maintains trust, rather than the actual 
doing so. From this perspective, institutions make trust possible, and particularly those 
institutions that promote ‘the important role of democratic discourse in mediating 
institutions by constantly testing, revising, invigorating, and communicating norms’ 
(Warren, 1999, pp. 349-350). 
 
It is the cognitive trust that we would expect to be related to the social or generalised trust 
of social capital, where the engagement of people in their community would provide 
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experience upon which to base judgments of the trustworthiness of impersonal others. 
Social capital theory states that the trust developed from the personal experience of civic 
engagement is generalised to include those one does not know. In other words, there is a 
socialisation process where one learns to trust through the knowledge one gains through 
one’s personal experiences and this is then generalised to the broader community. 
 
According to Putnam (1993, p. 171), ‘the theory of social capital argues that associational 
membership should … increase social trust’. Participation in the community develops the 
capacity for social, or ‘thin’ trust. ‘Thin’ or ‘generalised’ trust can be described as              
‘a standing decision to give most people – even those whom one does not know from 
direct experience – the benefit of the doubt’ (Putnam, 2000, p. 136). This means that 
people in a community with strong social capital are not only more trusting of those they 
know (‘thick’ or particularised trust), but are also more trusting of those they do not know 
well, or do not know at all (‘thin’ or generalised trust). In Putnam’s (1993, p. 173) view, 
the development of generalised or social trust comes from interactions in horizontally 
structured organisations like ‘neighborhood associations, choral societies, cooperatives, 
sports clubs, mass-based parties’. Here Putnam is talking about socially ‘equal’ 
relationships where people who may not know each other, possibly of different social 
status, come together as equal members of the same organisation (Boeckmann & Tyler, 
1997). Through such interactions people learn generalised trust and generalised reciprocity, 
both of which, according to Putnam (1993, p. 174) are dependent ‘on reliable information 
about the past behavior and present interests of potential partners … the greater the 
communication (both direct and indirect) among participants, the greater their mutual 
trust’. 
 
Putnam (1993, p. 174) argues that the same effect cannot be sustained in vertically 
structured groups and organisations because the flow of information is less reliable and 
sanctions are less likely or able to be imposed from the bottom up. This is the case with 
vertical client-patron relationships which are based on ‘dependence instead of mutuality’ 
and where the patron can exploit the relationship (Putnam, 1993, p. 175). Further, Putnam 
(2000) stresses that even though different forms of trust may or may not be correlated with 
each other, theoretically they should be distinguished. ‘Trust in government may be a 
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cause or a consequence of social trust, but it is not the same thing as social trust’ (Putnam, 
2000, p. 137). Others, too, maintain that trust in government or in institutions is different to 
the trust one has in other individuals (Hardin, 1998; Luhmann, 2000; Offe, 1999; Warren, 
1999). 
 
So can we trust institutions? 
 
The argument that trust in others in the community and trust in government are acquired in 
different ways does not preclude the possibility of common ground between them, 
although few have advanced this argument as such (for an exception see V. Braithwaite, 
1998). 
 
Indeed some go further to argue that one cannot have trust in inanimate objects and 
systems; rather one has confidence in them (Cohen, 1999; Luhmann, 1979; Offe, 1999; 
Seligman, 1997). When referring to social groups in contrast to government institutions, 
the distinction is made between trust and confidence. Papadakis (1999, p. 88) found that 
‘high levels of interpersonal trust are associated with confidence in public institutions’ (our 
emphasis). 
 
But is this dismissal of common ground between social and institutional (political) trust 
premature? Are government institutions really inanimate in the minds of citizens? People 
may see an institution in two ways – an abstract system (for example, the police force, the 
education system, the government, the taxation system), or as a system run by and 
regulated by people who are also members of the community, and with whom they 
interact. If people see the institutions of government in more abstract terms it is less likely 
they would generalise social trust to institutions, rather they would have confidence in 
them. Alternatively, it may be that social trust can be extended to political institutions if 
people see the institution as a ‘social group’ which is part of their community and with 
which they identify through shared interests. While not conclusive, there is evidence to 
suggest that citizens personify their government and its agencies, particularly when things 
go wrong (see Hobson, 2002; Murphy, 2002; Murphy, 2003; Senate Economics References 
Committee, 2001). That members of the community see their interaction with the Tax 
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Office as relational is suggested in the common reference to the ‘Tax Man’ - a 
personification of the symbol, that is, the abstract system, negating its inanimate facade. 
 
Recognition of the ways in which we construct relationships between government and 
ourselves is also implied by the ‘psychological contract’, carrying with it ‘emotional ties 
and loyalties’ (Feld & Frey, 2002). This relationship or contract holds people to their 
promises, but must be two-way: government must keep its promises, the people theirs. A 
breach of the psychological contract can have serious consequences for compliance, 
including compliance with taxation obligations (Feld & Frey, 2002). 
 
For the relationship between community and government to function, the community has 
granted ‘discretionary power’ to the institutions of government (Warren, 1999). However, 
the community’s subservience is not unconditional; it does it with certain expectations of 
government and its institutions. Murphy (2003) captures this phenomenon when she quotes 
one tax scheme investor: ‘Well, I don’t trust them [the Tax Office] any more … they’re not 
very well organised; they are running a reactionary-mode tax department’ (our emphasis). 
Levi (1998, p. 88) describes the relationship between citizen and government as one of 
‘contingent consent’. This relies in part on citizens’ perceptions of the trustworthiness of 
government, and ‘mutual trust between government and citizen’ (Levi, 1998, p. 88). 
 
It is not only the community that personalises its relationship with the institutions of 
government. The reverse is also the case. Institutions do this publicly through their 
Charters. The Tax Office released its Taxpayers’ Charter in 1996 after extensive 
consultation with the Australian community. This document is a psychological or social 
contract rather than a legal contract. The Charter outlines the mutual rights and obligations 
of the Tax Office and the community with regard to the meeting of taxation obligations. 
 
The reasons outlined above suggest that we may also consider the idea that people do trust 
in government institutions. We may extend trust to institutions because we have a 
relationship with the impersonal others who work there, as well as a psychological contract 
expressed on both sides. We may trust institutions because we have knowledge about 
them, or the opportunity to gather it if we choose, to make a judgment about an institution 
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and come to a decision that it is trustworthy. That decision may be based on our 
assessment of the institution, our knowledge and our judgments of their competence and 
their ability to meet our expectations. This knowledge may be gained through our personal 
experience or the experience of others known to us. Or the initial trust we give to 
government institutions may be based on our ability to generalise our experiences from 
familiar environments to unfamiliar ones, from local institutions to those that are distant. 
We acknowledge that people may view government institutions as abstract systems in 
which they have confidence rather than trust. However, people often do refer to 
government institutions in a personal and familiar way and give trust to these institutions. 
Rather than trying to show that it is either trust or confidence that people have in 
government institutions, we aim to shed some light on whether citizens do relate to 
government institutions through their social relationships and consider these institutions to 
be part of the community. 
 
Hypotheses 
 
The main objective in this paper is to determine the factors which influence the 
development of trust in strangers and whether this extends to the development of trust in 
the Tax Office. We will explore this through three hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1: According to Putnam’s social capital thesis, civic engagement and 
associational membership should predict trust in the community (social trust). 
 
Hypothesis 2: If trust is generalisable without civic engagement, trust in family and friends 
should directly predict trust in the community. 
 
Hypothesis 3: If trust is generalisable and if citizens relate to government as they relate to 
strangers, trust in the community (social trust) should directly predict trust in institutions, 
specifically the Tax Office. 
 
 
 
 9
Method 
 
This study relies on data collected as part of the Community Participation and Citizenship 
Survey conducted between August and December 2000. The sample comprised 1999 
people from the general population in New South Wales and Victoria, and was drawn from 
the Australian electoral roll. The unadjusted response rate was 42%. When adjusted for 
persons who had moved or who were deceased the response rate was 44% or 837 persons. 
 
Comparison with Australian Bureau of Statistics population estimates showed that survey 
respondents were generally representative on standard social demographic indicators such 
as sex, occupation, and marital status. 
 
Differences of note were found on age and education. People younger than 39 years of age 
are under-represented, specifically 18 to 24 year olds. Those between 40 and 65 years old 
are over-represented. The responses under-represented those with no post secondary 
education and over-represented those with post secondary education. This lends weight to 
the hypothesis of response bias in mail surveys towards the educated (Moser & Kalton, 
1971, p. 268). 
 
Trust variables 
 
Trust in particular others and strangers 
 
Trust in particular others and trust in strangers were measured using questions based on the 
Pew Research Center (1997) survey on trust in Philadelphia. Respondents indicated how 
much they would trust eight groups of people: (a) people in your immediate family; 
(b) people in your neighbourhood; (c) your boss or supervisor (if employed); (d) people 
you work with (if employed); (e) people at your church or place of worship; (f) people in 
the same clubs or activities as you; (g) people who work in the stores where you shop; 
(h) people you encounter downtown. The items were scored on a four-point scale from      
1 = ‘trust them a lot’ to 4 = ‘not trust them at all’. The items were recoded for analysis so 
that the higher the score the greater the trust in others. These questions measure trust 
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developed through horizontal ties, that is, those involved are on a relatively equal social 
footing. 
 
Institutional trust 
 
Institutional trust was also measured using questions adapted from the Pew Research 
Center survey on trust (1997). Respondents were asked to indicate how much they could 
trust a set of institutions or organisations, with trust explained as ‘the trust you have in 
their ability to meet community needs and expectations’. The set of seven institutions 
known to Australians were: (a) the police stations in your area; (b) the fire station in your 
area; (c) the public schools in your area; (d) your local council; (e) the newspapers; (f) the 
television news channels in your city; (g) the hospitals in your city; (h) the Tax Office; 
(i) the federal government. The items were measured on a four-point scale ranging from    
1 = ‘trust them a lot’ to 4 = ‘not trust them at all’. The items were again recoded for the 
analysis so that a high score meant greater trust in institutions and government. This 
measure of trust stems from vertical networks and is a form of thin trust. 
 
Trust scales 
 
The seventeen items measuring trust in particular others, trust in strangers and trust in 
institutions were factor analysed with the purpose of developing a set of trust scales (see 
Uslaner, 2002 for a similar analysis). The results of a principal components factor analysis 
using varimax rotation are presented in Table 1. Four scales representing trust of different 
kinds were used for further analyses: (a) trust in family and friends; (b) trust in strangers; 
(c) trust in government institutions supplying services; and (d) trust in political institutions. 
The items comprising each scale have factor loadings in bold in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Results of a principal components factor analysis and varimax rotation of 
trust variables 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Scale Strangers Political Service Family/ 
Friends 
People encountered downtown 0.852    
People in stores where you shop 0.811    
People in same clubs or activities 0.628    
People in neighbourhood 0.612    
People at your church 0.431    
Newspapers  0.840   
Television news channels  0.780   
Federal government  0.621   
Local council  0.598   
Tax Office  0.576   
Fire stations in your area   0.812  
Police stations in your area   0.736  
Hospitals in your city   0.549  
Public schools in your area   0.534  
Boss or supervisor    0.762 
Immediate family    0.703 
People you work with 0.422   0.701 
% variance 17% 16% 13% 12% 
Total variance       58% 
 
These results bear some similarity to the analysis of United States survey data by Uslaner 
(2002), confirming a separation of trust in strangers and trust in family and friends, that is, 
social and particularised trust. Unlike Uslaner, however, we found that government 
institutions divided into two factors - those departments supplying services and who are 
visible at the local community level, and those more remote, less recognisable and more 
preoccupied with the business of politics. 
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Independent variables 
 
Social capital variables 
 
The measurement of social capital has been, and remains, problematic (Cohen, 1998; Levi, 
1996; Paxton, 1999; Putnam, 2000). The micro/macro issues are of particular concern. 
Social capital is not an individual attribute, but it can be measured at both the individual 
and the collective level. This study relies on individual measures of social capital concepts. 
In other words, individuals were asked about their own levels of participation and 
engagement in society. 
 
The measures of civic engagement included a wide range of activities representing both the 
formal and the informal ties people have with others. The majority of the questions were 
based on the Pew Research Center (1997) trust survey, with adaptations to suit the 
Australian context. The areas of civic engagement covered could be grouped into four 
categories: (a) personal/leisure; (b) democratic participation; (c) voluntary work; and 
(d) news watching, listening and reading. The specific items associated with each category 
are set out in Table 2.3 
 
Civic engagement was measured at two levels – whether or not one ever engaged in the 
activity and whether or not one regularly engaged in the activity. Within social capital 
theory, the inference is that regular engagement in activities with the same people builds 
capacity to trust. But sometimes regular engagement is practically unlikely. For example, 
protests or demonstrations are unlikely to be regular activities for most people. Thus, we 
measured both exposure to activities as well as regularity of engagement. A further 
advantage of this approach was that comparing measures enabled us to determine whether 
frequency of engagement was of consequence. In order to collect information on both 
                                                 
3 Putnam (1993) has treated interest in the news as an indicator of civicness. He included only newspaper 
readership in his Italian study because in Italy it was the ‘medium with the broadest coverage of community 
affairs’ but acknowledged that in the modern world other mass media also feature in carrying the news to the 
community (1993, p. 92). In Australia, people keep up with local, national and international news via 
television, newspapers and radio so all three forms of media were included in this study. We acknowledge 
that studies have shown that the mass media, particularly television, can have a negative effect on people 
(Jeffres, Atkin & Neuendorf, 2002). However, other studies have shown the opposite or a nil effect on both 
political and social activity, and highlight that newspaper readership strongly predicts political and social 
involvement (Jeffres, Atkin & Neuendorf, 2002). 
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exposure and regularity, respondents were asked to indicate how much time they had spent 
participating in activities over the last six months (‘never’, ‘sometimes’, ‘monthly’, 
‘weekly’ or ‘daily’). 
 
Developing civic engagement indices 
 
Eight multi-item indices were formed to measure civic engagement - four indices 
represented exposure to personal/leisure, democratic participation, volunteering and the 
media and four represented regularity of engagement in these four types of activity. 
Measures of exposure to civic engagement were formed by dichotomising frequency of 
exposure into ‘never’ versus ‘sometimes’, ‘monthly’, ‘weekly’, ‘daily’. To obtain measures 
of regularity of civic engagement, the data were again dichotomised into ‘never’ and 
‘sometimes’ versus ‘monthly’, ‘weekly’, ‘daily’. Each index was calculated through 
counting the number of activities to which the respondent had been exposed (or which 
were performed regularly). It should be emphasised that the measure was oriented to 
assessing diversity of participation (the number of different activities) not intensity of 
participation in some or any one activity. Our objective was to differentiate between the 
number of regular activities a person engaged in as opposed to the number of exposures to 
activity a person had. (The items comprising each of the indices are listed in Table 2.) 
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Table 2: Civic engagement items 
Activity index Items in index 
Personal/Leisure Continuing or adult education 
Exercising or working out 
Attending a self-help group 
Attending clubs or associations 
Attending church or religious services 
Participating in special interest groups 
Participating in organised sporting activities 
Playing cards or board games with a usual group of friends 
Using a computer for personal e-mail, on-line discussions, chat groups 
Children participating in sports teams or sporting activities 
Children participating in music or dance lessons 
Children participating in art and craft activities 
Children participating in other activities 
Democratic 
participation 
Attending a town council meeting or public hearing 
Calling or sending a letter to an elected official 
Joining or contributing money to an organisation in support of a cause 
Participating in union activities 
Joining with co-workers to solve a workplace problem 
Participating in professional or industry association activities 
Contacting local council members 
Voluntary work Volunteering for church or religious group 
Volunteering for a political organisation 
Volunteering for a school or tutoring program 
Volunteering for environmental organisations 
Volunteering for child or youth development programs 
Volunteering for arts or cultural organisations 
Volunteering for a hospital, health or counselling organisation 
Volunteering for a local government, neighbourhood, civic or community 
group 
Volunteering for an organisation to help the poor, elderly or homeless 
News watching, 
listening and 
reading 
Regularly watching the news on television 
Watched the news or a news program on television yesterday 
Regularly reading any daily newspaper or newspapers 
Read a daily newspaper yesterday 
Listening to the news on the radio 
 
Findings 
 
Relationships between the trust variables 
 
The results in Table 3 confirm that the different types of trust are significantly related to 
each other. Note that the trust in political institutions scale includes the Tax Office item 
which partially explains the high correlation with trust in the Tax Office. When the Tax 
Office item was dropped from the political institutions scale, trust in the Tax Office 
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remained significant in its relationship with trust in other political institutions (r = 0.53,     
p < 0.01). 
 
Table 3: Intercorrelations between the trust scales 
Type of trust (M, SD, ) 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Family/Friends (3.23, 0.56, 0.67) - 0.61** 0.39** 0.29** 0.23** 
2. Strangers (2.70, 0.57, 0.81) - - 0.51** 0.42** 0.32** 
3. Service institutions (3.21, 0.50, 0.69) - - - 0.47** 0.40** 
4. Political institutions (2.35, 0.56, 0.78) - - - - 0.73** 
5. Tax Office (-) - - - - - 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The results of the correlational analysis between the four trust scales, the single item trust 
in the Tax Office and the eight civic engagement indices appear in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Correlations between the trust scales and civic engagement indices 
Trust 
Civic 
Engagement 
Family/ 
Friends 
Strangers Service 
Institutions 
Political 
Institutions 
Tax Office 
Exposure   
   Personal 0.12** 0.07* -0.03 0.04 -0.05 
   Volunteer 0.06 0.15** 0.04 0.08* 0.04 
   Democratic 0.14** 0.06 0.02 0.01 -0.02 
   Media -0.01 0.07* 0.10** 0.10** 0.03 
      
Regular      
   Personal 0.19** 0.15** 0.04 0.07* 0.03 
   Volunteer 0.17** 0.20** 0.07 0.09* 0.07* 
   Democratic 0.11** 0.10** 0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
   Media -0.01 0.07* 0.10** 0.10** 0.03 
** significant at the 0.01 level 
  * significant at the 0.05 level 
 
In general, the regular civic engagement indices were more highly correlated with the trust 
measures than were the exposure measures, thus supporting the notion that repeated 
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contact with others outside one’s intimate group builds social trust. As Putnam would 
predict, regular civic engagement and associational membership had most impact on social 
trust (trust in strangers). Moreover, civic engagement had little relationship to trust in 
government institutions. The central issue to emerge from the correlational analysis 
concerns the role of the civic engagement variables, specifically, regular civic engagement. 
They predict trust in strangers, but not institutional trust, but they also are associated with 
trust in friends and family. There is a consistent pattern of correlation between trust in 
family and friends and civic engagement. This raises the question of whether trust in 
strangers is directly associated with trust in family and friends or whether it is primarily 
shaped by civic engagement. 
 
In setting up a causal model for testing, it seems implausible that civic engagement would 
boost trust in friends and family. It is more plausible that a lack of trust in one’s intimate 
circle reflects social breakdown/stress of some kind which, in turn, would deplete 
resources for civic engagement. Without measures of all the variables in this causal chain, 
trust in family and friends and civic engagement are best conceptualised as covariates in 
this study. Thus, we are assuming that although related, trust in family and friends and 
civic engagement will each have an influence in their own right on trust in strangers. Trust 
in strangers, in turn, should be generalisable to trust in institutions, possibly mediated by 
civic engagement. 
 
Structural equation model 
 
To continue our analysis and test for relationships among the civic engagement and trust 
variables, we constructed a structural equation model using Analysis of Moment Structures 
(AMOS) (see Figure 1). 
 
The model tested here focuses on one political institution, the Tax Office.4 The AMOS 
procedure is used to test for links between civic engagement and the different kinds of 
trust, from trust in family and friends through trust in strangers, through trust in service 
                                                 
4 In a further publication (in progress), the Tax Office will be replaced in the structural equation model with 
the complete trust in political institutions scale. 
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oriented institutions through trust in the Tax Office. Prior to arriving at this model, several 
models were tested in which civic engagement (indices used individually and as a set) was 
postulated as mediating the trust in strangers-trust in institutions relationship. None of 
these models had acceptable goodness-of-fit indices and therefore they were set aside in 
favour of the model presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Regular engagement and trust model 
 
Overall, support was found for the idea that civic engagement built trust in strangers. Of 
significance in the findings, once we had controlled for civic engagement, was 
considerable support for the generalisation of trust hypothesis. If one trusts those close to 
them, they are more likely to trust strangers. In turn, one is more likely to trust service 
institutions. If one trusts service institutions, one is more likely to trust the Tax Office. 
 
What is remarkable from Figure 1 is that civic engagement has only a minor part to play in 
the development of trust in strangers and the impersonal others in government institutions. 
By far the strongest path to trust in strangers originates from trust in family and friends and 
not from civic engagement. Trust in strangers and institutions does not need to be mediated 
by civic engagement, though it has some influence. There is a weak but direct relationship 
between regular engagement with the media and both trust in strangers and trust in service 
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institutions. There is also a weak but direct relationship between regular volunteering and 
trust in strangers. These results support Putnam’s argument that civic engagement and 
associational membership teaches one to generalise trust to those unknown. Presumably, 
being with others allows people to exchange information about the trustworthiness or 
reliability of institutions they may have dealt with, just as engaging with the media does. 
However, regular engagement in personal activity and participation in democratic activity 
has no effect on the development of any type of trust. 
 
There is support for the hypothesis that trust is generalisable. There was a strong and direct 
relationship between trust in family and friends and trust in strangers. There is also support 
for the hypothesis that citizens who trust strangers extend their trust to government 
institutions, particularly institutions that provide service at the community level. There is a 
strong and direct relationship between trust in strangers and trust in service institutions. It 
is also interesting that trust in family and friends has a direct effect on the development of 
trust in service institutions. Institutions such as schools, hospitals, police and fire brigades 
are visible in our communities, and demonstrably share the interests of the community by 
giving help and support at the local level. Figure 1 suggests that trust in institutions, like 
the Tax Office, is shaped by the trust we have generalised to strangers and trust in service 
institutions. 
 
It is of note that there is no direct relationship between any of the civic engagement indices 
and trust in ‘political’ institutions like the Tax Office. This partly supports Putnam’s more 
recent statements that trust in government is not the same as social trust – that is, it is not 
developed through civic engagement. However, in this study we found evidence of a direct 
relationship between engagement with the media and service institutions, although it is 
weak. This finding extends Putnam’s original social capital thesis, demonstrating that trust 
in institutions is partly affected by social capital factors. The strongest predictor of trust in 
the Tax Office was trust in service institutions, and to a lesser extent trust in strangers - 
support for the hypothesis that trust is generalised. 
 
Government institutions like the Tax Office are more remote from the local community 
and are not as recognisable in the community as those in the service institutions. However, 
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our findings suggest that people understand and support the role ‘political’ institutions like 
the Tax Office play and generalise trust to them. These findings support the hypothesis that 
trust is generalisable, not just to strangers but also to the impersonal others in the 
institutions of government, particularly those institutions providing services at the local 
community level. These findings suggest that the ways in which citizens relate to 
government institutions are influenced by the ways in which they relate to strangers. 
 
The goodness-of-fit indices for the regular civic engagement and trust model are presented 
in Table 5. According to modification indices, the adding or deleting of paths could not 
improve the model. There was no evidence of multicollinearity. Cross validation was 
undertaken through splitting the sample randomly into two equal groups. No significant 
differences emerged between the samples in the results of the factor analysis, the 
correlations and the structural equation model. 
 
Table 5: Chi-square statistics and the goodness-of-fit indices for the regular activities 
model linking civic engagement to types of trust 
Goodness-of-fit statistics Regular activities model 

 = Chi-Square 8.28, p < 0.602 
df = Degrees of Freedom 10 
CFI = Comparative Fit Index 1.000 
GFI = Goodness-of-Fit Index 0.998 
AGFI = Adjusted Goodness-of-Fit Index 0.991 
RMSEA = Root Mean Square 0.000 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
 
While partial support is provided for Putnam’s thesis, this does not seem to be the main 
story of institutional trust. Civic engagement and associational membership has some 
effect on the building of trust in strangers and trust in government institutions and abstract 
systems, but the effect is limited. Where there is an effect, it is activity specific. 
Participation in civic activities in the forms of volunteering and engagement with the news 
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may teach us to trust unfamiliar others by giving us some of the information we need to 
form opinions about the reliability or trustworthiness of others. 
 
What these results suggest is that trust in family and friends is more important in the 
development of generalised trust in strangers and government institutions such as the Tax 
Office. Trusting those we know intimately has a profound influence on how much trust we 
extend to those we do not know. It appears that the generalisation of trust works like 
ripples in a pond – the ripples are stronger at the source (the family), move out over a wide 
distance and envelop all they contact (friends, acquaintances, strangers and impersonal 
others) but decrease in strength as they extend further out over the pond (to those less 
visible government institutions like the Tax Office). Strength at the source makes the 
ripples stronger and able to spread across a greater distance – there is generalised or 
bridging trust. Weaker ripples at source reduce the distance the ripples cover, and there is 
less bridging trust. 
 
Trust in political institutions such as the Tax Office develops because we trust in our local 
service institutions and we trust local service institutions because we trust in strangers. We 
have learned to do that through trusting intimate others. The service institutions 
represented in this research all operate at local level, familiar enough for people to feel 
they know them and share their interests. The ‘thick’ trust we develop at the horizontal 
level in family, friends and co-workers, enables us to extend or generalise trust to those we 
do not know, at both the horizontal level (strangers) and the vertical level (government 
institutions). We generalise trust to government institutions because we relate to the 
impersonal others in these institutions in the way we relate to any other stranger, through 
our shared interests. However, the finding of the importance of service institutions flags a 
possible caveat. If there is reason to doubt the existence of mutual interests, or perhaps in 
the face of evidence of corruption in government, the trust ‘ripple’ is likely to be 
interrupted. This question is an important one to be addressed in future research. 
 
In summary, these findings confirm the importance of family and close acquaintance in the 
development of trust – the affective factor in trust. They have also opened up the 
possibility of cognitive factors playing a role in the development of trust through support 
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for Putnam’s thesis that engagement in the affairs of one’s community builds generalised 
or social trust. The main finding, however, is that people do relate to institutions like the 
Tax Office on a subjective basis in that they generalise ‘thick’ trust to government 
institutions which one might think involved at best ‘thin’ trust. It remains plausible that 
people have trust in government institutions, not just confidence in an abstract system. This 
is not to deny that people may still view institutions as abstract systems in which they have 
confidence. In testing the relevance of trust in institutions, this research draws attention to 
trust of a more relational kind. People seem to see institutions as part of their social 
relationships and extend trust from significant others to these institutions. Both affective 
and cognitive factors need to be recognised as having a part to play in the development and 
maintenance of the trust relationship. 
 
Our findings raise the question of whether it is predominantly subjective or affective 
factors at play in the development of trust in strangers and impersonal others, including 
those in institutions such as the Tax Office. It is unlikely that affective and cognitive 
components of trust define different kinds of trust. It seems more likely that trust, whether 
it is in the family or in the Tax Office, combines the affect that comes with a sense of 
belonging and feeling safe with the cognitions of knowing what has happened in the past 
(see V. Braithwaite’s work [1998] on trust norms). If trust in institutions has its roots in 
trust that has developed in the family and with those we are close to, these data put forward 
another model of trust: we generalise trust and extend it to strangers until we have 
knowledge from our experiences with that person or others that it would be a risk to us to 
continue to give that trust. 
 
What is the relevance of the findings of this study for government and its institutions? 
Encouraging people to become civically engaged may have only the smallest of parts to 
play in building trust and social capital. It appears that affective trust has a major role in 
building trust. At a more fundamental level, this research demonstrates why. Government 
institutions such as the Tax Office begin their task with benefits accrued through 
generalised trust, trust that is already in place between citizens and between the community 
and the institutions of government. Citizens extend this trust to government institutions 
presumably because they believe the community and government institutions have shared 
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interests. The groups to which we belong, and in which we find our identity and feel pride, 
can extend from the intimate (being part of a family) to the superordinate (being 
Australian) (see Taylor, 2003; Rawlings, 2003). To be seen as trustworthy, government 
institutions need to behave in a way that nurtures and facilitates the generalised trust that 
citizens have for each other. They can do this by behaving in a fair and just manner, 
demonstrating that they share the same ethical standards and values as the community. As 
well as trying to build confidence in the systems of government, institutions need to 
remember that trust is also a factor because citizens see institutions as part of their social 
relationships and identify with the impersonal others who work in government institutions. 
Institutions which ‘behave’ in a way that suggests they do not trust members of the 
community, or in ways which favour one group in the community over another, 
immediately jeopardise the basic trust relationship (see V. Braithwaite, 2003c). We have 
seen this with the tax scheme investors in Murphy’s study (2003; see also Murphy, 2002). 
Not only is behaviour that jeopardises the trust relationship ineffective but it undermines 
the trust relationship and the legitimacy of the tax system. 
 
The findings of this study are important in building a bridge between research that focuses 
on building capacity (education, social welfare) and research that focuses on regulating 
society (for example, taxation, policing). The data presented in this paper show that trust in 
the institutions of government has its basis in the trust that develops in the homes, schools 
and workplaces. If homes, schools and workplaces fail to provide security for individuals 
or fail to provide safe space where individuals can learn to trust, there is very little 
likelihood they will trust institutions of government. 
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